Separating these three factors may unnecessarily imply different operating processes, but of course they are all intertwined and part of the same process.At any rate because of these three processes, and undoubtedly others, the Chinese economy was focused primarily on producing and hoarding.But for this policy to work for such a large economy, it needed the rest of the world (i.e. the US, whose markets were huge, whose financial system was extremely flexible, and whose consumers proved very easily convinced) to play along, and the China-US balance of payments relationship was the obvious result.
China has now found itself stuck in a savings trap.The currency regime has been so successful at boosting the trade surplus that the trade surplus has run out of control and every attempt to rein it in has failed.Unfortunately the currency regime has put into place a self-reinforcing system in which rising trade surpluses cause too-rapid expansion of the money supply, which is funneled by the banking system into greater industrial production, which causes further upward pressure on the trade surplus.It is difficult for China to escape from this trap without a sharp adjustment in the currency, but aside from the continuing need to boost employment, one of the consequences of the currency regime and its subsequent impact on monetary conditions may have been the creation of a very shaky banking system and overinvestment into both production and speculative assets.Since all of these are funded by the banking system, any sharp adjustment, aside from the adverse short term impact on employment, could have significant unintended consequences for the country’s very rigid and opaque financial system.
Much of the argument about the impact of the currency regime on China’s trade surpluses or the US trade deficit misses the point.Many economists argue that China should not revalue because revaluing the RMB would have no impact on net US-China trade.They say that since 40% of China’s exports are reprocessed imports, a change in the value of the currency would simply net out in the final export prices for a large fraction of Chinese exports.They also argue that China competes largely with other Asian countries, so even if a revaluation caused its export prices to rise significantly, the only effect would be to shift its trade surplus to other Asian countries, which would leave the US and European trade deficits with Asia unchanged.Finally, since China is the dominant player in many of its foreign export markets, it has sufficient pricing power that a rise in its export prices would have a minimal impact on its sales volumes, and in fact could actually cause the monetary value of its exports to rise further.
In spite of the fact that all but the first of these arguments are intellectually dubious for a number of reasons, and in fact really argue in favor of a currency revaluation (after all, if raising the value of the RMB will have little impact on China’s export volumes, and may even boost them, why not revalue and so improve China’s terms of trade?), they miss the main currency argument.China is running a rising trade surplus because, by definition, it produces more than it consumes, and production is growing faster than consumption.The root cause of the excess and growing Chinese production – as I see it, anyway, and have repeated ad nauseum in my blog – is China’s out-of-control monetary expansion.This is itself caused by the rising trade surplus and augmented by FDI, attracted by the impact of an undervalued currency on real assets, and hot money inflows, aimed at taking advantage of the expected currency rise. A revelaution will not reduce the trade surplus because of its direct impact on export prices. It would reduce the trade surplus if it caused a reversal of capital flows sufficient to eliminate the monetary expansion that is at the root of the growing surplus.
As long as China is locked into this system, the trade surpluses will not go away.Until there is a sharp adjustment – voluntary on the part of the financial authorities in the form of a maxi-revaluation, or involuntary in the form of a banking or investment crisis, which I fear is increasingly likely – it is not possible for China to get out of this trap.
In China consumption levels are not nearly enough to absorb the level of production needed to maintain employment (unemployment is actually rising, especially among college graduates).This is just another way of saying that Chinese savings are too high.This is also just another way of saying that China must run a trade surplus, and if China must run a trade surplus, and if it invests almost all of its reserves directly or indirectly (as in when it purchases oil stocks) in US assets, it is almost inevitable that the US run a trade deficit.The only logical alternative would be for Europe or Japan to replace the US in that role, and for structural and political reasons I think this will be difficult.
If you agree that Bernanke is right – the world is saving too much – then the argument that we need to boost US savings could be a very dangerous one.A world with excess savings does not need its largest economy to save more.Of course a sudden rise in US savings would quickly reduce the US trade deficit, but it would do so not by boosting US or global demand for US products but rather by depressing US demand for imports.Since US exports are highly correlated with US imports, a reduction in US import demand would probably also lead to a reduction in US exports (the US sells the machinery used to make the goods that are sold to the US), meaning that total US imports would have to decline by more than the current trade deficit in order to bring it into balance, because US exports would also decline.
Global and US consumption and production, in other words, would have to fall, and the US and the world must become poorer for the US trade deficit to go away.It is no secret that one way of eliminating the US trade deficit would be for US consumption to collapse and unemployment to rise, and I worry that this is exactly what a boost in US savings means.If you think that growing foreign claims on the US are such a severe problem that it is worth increasing unemployment in the short term to correct the imbalance, then you might still support boosting US savings, and the short-term consequences be damned, but if you are not worried, as I am not, it seems like too high a price to pay.
By the way, the reason a country should save is so that its investment needs are met.The US is an exception.Its financial system is able to draw on global savings for all its domestic investment needs.I am not sure “excess” consumption is as much a problem for Americans as it would be for other countries, although I would never say this in polite company for fear of getting hit on the head with bricks by all the millions of puritans and contrarians out there.
The real problem in the US-China relationship is not in the US, I think.It seems to me that China has the bigger problem.China cannot afford an interruption of this system, but unfortunately it is locked into a series of what I think are unsustainable processes.It cannot afford such rapid monetary growth but it has no easy way in which to turn it off.It cannot continue to channel so much money into speculation and overinvestment, but again there is no way to slow things down.Because the financial authorities are so reluctant to make tough decisions now, the decisions are very likely to be forced onto them by adverse events in the markets, and it is almost certain that these will come at the worst possible time. China simply does not have the flexibility the US economy has, and its ability to absorb shocks is limited.
Michael Pettis is a professor at Peking University's Guanghua School of Management, where he specializes in Chinese financial markets. He has also taught, from 2002 to 2004, at Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management and, from 1992 to 2001, at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business. He is a member of the board of directors of ABC-CA Fund Management Co., a Sino-French joint venture based in Shanghai.
Pettis has worked on Wall Street in trading, capital markets, and corporate finance since 1987, when he joined the Sovereign Debt trading team at Manufacturers Hanover (now JP Morgan). Most recently, from 1996 to 2001, Pettis worked at Bear Stearns, where he was Managing Director-Principal heading the Latin American Capital Markets and the Liability Management groups. He has also worked as a partner in a merchant banking boutique that specialized in securitizing Latin American assets and at Credit Suisse First Boston, where he headed the emerging markets trading team. Besides trading and capital markets, Pettis has been involved in sovereign advisory work, including for the Mexican government on the privatization of its banking system, the Republic of Macedonia on the restructuring of its international bank debt, and the South Korean Ministry of Finance on the restructuring of the country’s commercial bank debt.
Pettis is a member of the Institute of Latin American Studies Advisory Board at Columbia University as well as the Dean’s Advisory Board at the School of Public and International Affairs. He is the author of several books, including The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economies and the Threat of Financial Collapse (Oxford University Press, 2001). He received an MBA in Finance in 1984 and an MIA in Development Economics in 1981, both from Columbia University.